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COMMENT
ANOTHER STAB AT SCHNECKLOTH: THE
PROBLEM OF LIMITED CONSENT
SEARCHES AND PLAIN VIEW SEIZURES
MCHAELJ. FRIEDMAN
I. INTRODUCTION
Shortly after dawn on the morning of October 18, 1996,
agents of the Drug Enforcement Administration arrived at the
apartment of Agripina Fernandez in the Washington Heights
section of Manhattan to execute a warrant for her arrest.' The
agents knocked and announced themselves as police officers,
and when Ms. Fernandez answered the door, they informed her
that she was under arrest for conspiracy to distribute narcotics.2
Ms. Fernandez, asserting her innocence, told the agents to "look
anywhere, you will see there is no drugs, there is no guns, I have
done no drug dealing."3 One of the agents later testified, "she
was very insistent that we look around ... because we weren't
going to find any drugs if we did."4 The agents then searched
Ms. Fernandez's purse and her dresser and found neither guns
nor drugs.5 They did, however, locate and seize numerous
documents which they believed tied Ms. Fernandez to the drug
conspiracy they were investigating. 6








The district court reviewing these events not implausibly
characterized Ms. Fernandez's words as a limited consent to
search for guns and drugs only.7 Nonetheless, the court allowed
the government to use evidence lying beyond the scope of that
consent against Ms. Fernandez." In this case and many others
like it, the words of the suspect's consent had remarkably little
bearing on what items the police could legally seize and use
against her.9 This gap between what a suspect says and what the
police may do in response is bridged by the plain view doctrine,
which allows officers to seize incriminating items found in the
course of an otherwise lawful search.10 The plain view doctrine
in general is well settled and uncontroversial, but its effect on
the candor of police requests for consent to search has not pre-
viously been examined.
The primary problem with plain view seizures during lim-
ited consent searches is that the consenting suspect gets less pri-
vacy than she bargained for. The suspect's clear, unambiguous
offer, taking Ms. Fernandez's case as an example, to look for
guns and drugs only, coupled with the agents' verbal acceptance
of that limitation, creates, in the parlance of contract law, an
agreement between police and suspect as to what may be
searched." But the plain view doctrine operates as the fine
print in that agreement, creating an exception which only the
police, and not the suspect, are aware of at the time the agree-
ment is made.
This situation is all the more abhorrent when a police offi-
cer deliberately deceives the suspect. The plain view doctrine
opens a wide avenue to the police for pretextual consent
searches. Consider the following: A police officer with a hunch,
'Id at 169. While Ms. Fernandez did begin her consent, "look anywhere," the dis-
trict court found that the context of her statement in its entirety placed limits on that
consent.
8 Id. at 171.
'Other cases like Padilla are discussed infra in Part InI.
See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990).
,Several courts have noted a parallel between search consents and contract law,
specifically Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 164, which voids contracts entered
into by a party relying on a fraudulent or material misrepresentation. See, e.g., State v.
Rodgers, 349 N.W.2d 453, 462 (Wis. 1984), and infra note 151 and accompanying
text.
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but without probable cause, that a suspect possesses an incrimi-
nating bed frame in his apartment asks the suspect for consent
to see the layout of his apartment to aid in the investigation of a
domestic dispute in an adjacent apartment.12 The suspect, as-
sured that he is not the subject of the investigation, consents.'
3
The officer then enters, looks at the layout of the apartment,
and finds the incriminating bed frame lying in plain view.1 4 This
scenario may seem far fetched, but it is exactly what happened
in a recent Colorado case. '5 In this case, and in other cases
where non-contraband evidence is found in plain view, the con-
senting suspect is unlikely to be aware that he is exposing any-
thing incriminating by consenting to a pretextual search
request. Yet he is left to ponder his lack of foresight from be-
hind bars.
The current state of search and seizure law does nothing to
help the deceived consenter. The Supreme Court neglected to
address the problem of limited consent searches in its most re-
cent explication of the plain view doctrine. 6 A plurality of the
Court in the 1971 case Coolidge v. New Hampshire17 required that,
among other conditions discussed below, police discovery of an
item be inadvertent for that item to be admissible.' 8 The plural-
ity reasoned that inadvertence prevents police from deliberately
expanding the scope of their search beyond the particularity of
their warrant.1 9 In 1990, after a number of jurisdictions began
ignoring the Coolidge inadvertence requirement because only
four justices had endorsed it, the Court revisited the issue, hold-
ing by a seven to two margin in Horton v. California" that inad-
vertence is not a necessary prerequisite of a lawful plain view
seizure.2' This Comment will argue that the Court's reasons for
12 SeePeople v. Zamora, 940 P.2d 939, 941 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996).
13 Id.
14 id.
"Id. Zamora is examined in depth infra in the text accompanying notes 152-69.
"SeeHorton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990).
"403 U.S. 443 (1971).
"Id. at 469-71.
Id. at 471.
496 U.S. 128 (1990).
"Id. at 130.
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jettisoning the inadvertence requirement, while entirely appro-
priate for searches initially justified by warrants or exigencies,
are not applicable to limited consent searches.2 2 On the con-
trary, the majority's logic in Horton, specifically the Court's con-
sideration of sinister police motives, supports a holding that
inadvertence should still be required for plain view seizures
executed during limited consent searches.23
This Comment will explore the problematic relationship be-
tween limited consent searches and plain view seizures. Part II
will trace the development of both the consent and plain view
exceptions to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amend-
ment. Part III will examine some recent state and federal cases
which turn on plain view extensions of limited consent searches.
These cases highlight the problems lurking at the intersection
of the two doctrines. Part IV will suggest several alternative
rules which could better guide courts confronted with plain
view seizures after limited consents, and will argue their efficacy.
Fortunately, plain view seizures during limited consent
searches do not happen often. For reasons discussed below,
limited consent searches only occur under rare circumstances. 2
Perhaps as a result of the infrequent occasions to visit this issue,
most courts have applied the plain view doctrine to limited con-
sent searches without acknowledging or questioning the special
problems implicated at the intersection of the two. Most of
these courts have admitted the evidence at issue so long as it was
found in areas authorized to be searched by the limited con-
sent. Nonetheless, I will argue that the deception, the potential
for pretextual intrusions, and the doctrinal failure in this un-
usual situation justifies a change in police protocol. When con-
ducting a limited consent search, police officers should be
required to warn the suspect that items other than the stated ob-
jects of the search will also be subject to seizure if the suspect
See Horton, 496 U.S. at 138-39. Consent is not mentioned at all in Horton. See in-
fta text accompanying notes 90-95 for a complete discussion of the Court's reasons
for no longer requiring inadvertence.
' The failure of the Horton logic in the consent search context is discussed at
length infra text accompanying notes 174-77.
2' See infra note 41 and accompanying text.
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grants consent. Such a requirement would amount to a retreat
from the Supreme Court's 1973 holding in Schneckloth v. Bus-
tamontP that a suspect's knowledge of his right to refuse con-
sent is not a necessary element of a valid consent. However, that
step is necessary to clarify, both for suspect and officer, exactly
what expectations of privacy will be honored in the ensuing
search.
II. BACKGROUND LAW
The Fourth Amendment commands:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be vio-
lated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.8
While the Supreme Court once read this language to re-
quire warrants for all searches and seizures, the modem Court
has instead directed only that a search or seizure be "reason-
able."2 7 In so shifting, the Court has carved out numerous ex-
ceptions -to the warrant requirement, both for searches and
seizures. These exceptions include: administrative inspections;28
exigent circumstances;2 consent searches;"0 searches incident
2412 U.S. 218 (1973).
U.S. CONST. amend. TV.
See, e.g., California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 581-85 (1991) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring) ("What [the Fourth Amendment] explicitly states regarding warrants is by way
of limitation upon their issuance rather than requirement of their use. ... [T]he
supposed 'general rule' that a warrant is always required does not appear to have any
basis in the common law and confuses rather than facilitates any attempt to develop
rules of reasonableness in light of changed legal circumstances. . ."). See generallyJo-
seph D. Grano, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment Warrant Requirement, 19 AM. CRIM. L.
REv. 603 (1982).
See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (reasonable legislative goals
provide enough probable cause tojustify administrative searches).
"See e.g., Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (hot pursuit of armed robber is
exigent circumstance justifying warrantless entry of a home and its full-scale search).
See also Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 572 (probable cause, but not a warrant, required to search
vehicles because they might flee the jurisdiction).
"See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 248-49 (allowing searches on the basis of voluntary
consent, such voluntariness to be determined by the totality of the circumstances).
See also infra Part II(A).
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to arrest;1 inventory searches; 2 frisks and protective sweeps;, 3
immigration inspections;s fire investigations;s the plain view
doctrine;s Terry stops; 37 road checkpoints;-" and interrogations
generally so long as the suspect reasonably perceives that he is
"at liberty to ignore the police presence and go about his busi-
ness." 9 Most relevant to this discussion are consent searches
and plain view seizures.
A. CONSENT SEARCHES
Police officers seek a suspect's consent to search for various
reasons: to avoid the delays and administrative inconvenience of
securing a warrant; to avoid the risk of suppression of evidence
intrinsic to the more technical warrant process; or simply be-
3' See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973) (allowing full dress search
without a warrant following a custodial arrest). See also Chimel v. California, 395 U.S.
752 (1969) (allowing warrantless search of area within suspect's immediate control
upon arrest). Ms. Fernandez's situation in Padilla does not fall under the search inci-
dent to arrest exception outlined in Chimel because the police sought to search an
area (her bedroom) well beyond her immediate control at the time of her arrest (Ms.
Fernandez was in the front entry area of her apartment at the time). See United
States v. Padilla, 986 F. Supp. 163, 166 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
12 See Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987) (allowing inventory search of im-
pounded car provided established procedures dictate when to do so); Illinois v.
Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640 (1983) (inventory of personal effects following arrest permit-
ted); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976) (warrantless inventory search
upheld as "routine administrative caretaking").
See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983) (warrantless search of passenger area
of car allowed where police have reasonable suspicion that it contains a weapon). See
also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at I (if officer has "reasonable suspicion" that a suspect is
armed, he may physically check whether suspect is armed, and if so, disarm him).
" See United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891 (1975) (fixed checkpoint stops allowed if
police have minimal discretion as to who to stop).
See Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978) (allowing warrantless searches follow-
ing fires).
-' See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990) (allowing warrantless seizure of an
item where police have lawful access to vantage point from which item is viewed, item
is in plain view when discovered, and it is immediately apparent to officers that item is
incriminating). See also infra Part 1(B).
7 See Terry, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675 (1985) (limit-
ing length of Terry stops).
See Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (allowing brief de-
tention at surprise sobriety checkpoints).
"' Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437 (1991) (quoting Michigan v. Chesternut, 486
U.S. 576, 569 (1988)).
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40cause they lack probable cause. Police also prefer consent
searches because, unless the suspect has the presence of mind
to qualify his consent, consent searches may be far broader in
scope than warrant searches which are confined by the Fourth
Amendment's particularity requirement. 4' Consent searches
can be general and exploratory, making it easy for police to jus-
tify their intrusion after the fact on the basis of what they have
already found, regardless of whether they had probable cause
before they found it.
The reasons why a suspect succumbs to a consent request
are far less obvious.42 In many cases, a suspect "voluntarily 43 al-
lows police to conduct a search that the suspect knows will un-
cover incriminating evidence, and courts have been quick to
point out the logical shortcomings of such a concession." "Vol-
untariness" is a very slippery term. In one sense, all decisions
made while a person is conscious, even those made under threat
40 3 WAYNE R. LAFAvE, SEAR CH AND SEIZURE § 8.1 (3d ed. 1996). See also RICHARD
VAN DUIzEND ET AL, THE SEARCH WARRANT PROCESS: PRECONCEPTIONS, PERCEPIONS,
AND PRACrCES 21 (1984) (collecting police officer anecdotes as to why consent is eas-
ier to get than a warrant, with one officer estimating that 98% of warrantless searches
in his city are justified on consent grounds).
41 See LAFAVE, supra note 40, § 8.1. Because consent searches are usually initiated
by police officers to allow a broad search, they are seldom of limited scope. Ms. Fer-
nandez's offer of consent in Padilla was unusual in that the suspect and not the offi-
cer initiated the discussion.
' "What is baffling about consent to search is why it is ever given. Why should
anyone surrender to the police, perhaps without a whimper, an interest recognized
both practically and legally to be of the first order and often resulting in the discovery
of evidence which incriminates the consenter?" Daniel L. Rotenberg, An Essay on
Consent(less) Police Searches, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 175, 187 (1991).
0All the government must show to validate a consent search is that the consent
was voluntary. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973), discussed infra in
the text accompanying notes 48-60.
" See e.g., People v. Massiah, 367 N.Y.S.2d 73, 75 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975) ("We can-
not credit the testimony of the police officer that the codefendant, an ex-felon, would
consent to a search with knowledge that the contraband sought was in the room in
open view. We refuse to credit testimony which has the appearance of having been
patently tailored to nullify constitutional objections"); Higgins v. United States, 209
F.2d 819, 820 (D.C. Cir. 1954) ("[N]o sane man who denies his guilt would actually
be willing that policemen search his room for contraband which is certain to be dis-
covered. It follows that when police identify themselves as such, search a room, and
find contraband in it, the occupant's words or signs of acquiescence in the search, ac-
companied by denial of guilt, do not show consent; at least in the absence of some ex-
traordinary circumstance, such as ignorance that contraband is present.").
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of physical violence or adverse legal consequences, are "volun-
tary" in that they represent a choice of alternatives.4 And in
another sense, no decisions are "voluntary" because all decisions
are based on the prior accumulation of external influences
which have inextricably shaped a person's values and desires
and have predetermined the outcome of any given decision.4
Somewhere between those extremes lies Stanley Milgram's obe-
dience theory, which also casts doubt on the meaningfulness of
"voluntary" consent by surmising that all encounters with law
enforcement personnel are inherently coercive.4 This Com-
ment does not endeavor to assign any normative values to these
theories or to take sides in the philosophical combat between
free will and determinism. Rather, the point here is that the
term "voluntariness" is possessed of a vast range of meanings,
and is consequently an extremely shaky foundation upon which
to build concrete rules of decision.
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court assigned great importance
to the concept of "voluntariness" in its major opinion on con-
sent searches, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte.s While on routine pa-
trol in Sunnyvale, California, a police officer stopped a vehicle
with a broken headlight and license plate light.49 After learning
that the driver had no license, the officer asked one of the six
passengers, who said the car belonged to his brother, for per-
" See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 224 (1973) ("Except where a per-
son is unconscious or drugged or otherwise lacks capacity for personal choice, all in-
criminating statements-even those made under brutal treatment-are voluntary in
the sense of representing a choice of alternatives").
16 SeeJoseph D. Grano, Voluntariness, Free Wdl, and the Law of Confessions, 65VA. L.
REv. 859 (1979); WilliamJ. Stuntz, Waiving Rights in Criminal Procedure, 75 VA. L. REV.
761 (1989); George C. Thomas M & Marshall D. Bilder, Ciminal Law: Aristotles Para-
dox and the Self-Incrimination Puzzle, 82J. CaM. L. & CRnNOLOGY 243 (1991).
" See Adrian J. Barrio, Note, Rethinking Schneckloth v. Bustamonte: Incorporating
Obedience Theory into the Supreme Court's Conception of Voluntary Consent, 97 U. ILL. L.
REv. 215 (1997); Rotenberg, supra note 42, at 187-89. Fear of some negative' reper-
cussion for refusing consent, while perhaps a natural reaction for most laymen, is
completely unfounded in law. A suspect's refusal to give consent cannot be consid-
ered suspicious conduct which can be used against him to establish probable cause.
See United States v. Skidmore, 894 F.2d 925, 927 (7th Cir. 1990); State v. Moreno, 619
So. 2d 62, 66 (La. 1993).
412 U.S. 218 (1973).
49 1d. at 220.
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mission to search the car.50 That passenger gave permission and
actually assisted in the search, opening the trunk and glove box
for the officer.5' The officer found three stolen checks under
the left rear seat, and arrested passenger Robert Bustamonte for
their theft. The question presented by this case was whether a
suspect's consent can be "voluntary" if the suspect is not in-
formed of his right to refuse consent. The California courts,
applying a rule that consent searches must be voluntary under
"the totality of the circumstances," affinmed the denial of Bus-
tamonte's suppression motion. On collateral review, the Ninth
Circuit disagreed, applying a "waiver of a constitutional right"
theory which requires that the suspect know he has the right to
refuse consent. 4
The Supreme Court adopted the California "totality of the
circumstances" test, holding that the suspect's knowledge of his
right to refuse consent is only one factor to consider in deter-
mining whether his consent is voluntary.55 In reaching this re-
sult, the only meaning the Court could muster for the term
"voluntariness" was the rather tautological claim that it reflects a
balance between the need for effective enforcement and "soci-
ety's deeply felt belief that the criminal law cannot be used as an
instrument of unfairness." 6
Satisfied with this meager definition of "voluntariness," the
Court spent the majority of its opinion weighing various tests for
determining whether a consent was in fact "voluntary."57 The
Court recognized the inherent difficulty of enforcing a test
which looks to the subjective state of mind of the consenting





-4 Id. at 221-22.
" Id. at 248-49.
6Id. at 224-25. This definition is tautological because it is the Fourth Amendment,
not the word "voluntariness" which must reflect the balance between police power
and individual liberties. The Court here merely restates its job as interpreter of the
Constitution; it does not define a complex term.
" Id. at 226-49.
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tively at the totality of the circumstances surrounding the sus-
pect's decision to consent, or requiring Miranda-type warnings
to alert all suspects to their right to refuse consent.f In adopt-
ing the former, the Court called the latter "thoroughly imprac-
tical." 9 The Court argued that warnings were inappropriate in
the consent search context because the Fifth and Sixth
Amendment trial rights protected by Miranda warnings are dif-
ferent from the Fourth Amendment property and liberty rights
implicated by consent searches:
A strict standard of waiver has been applied to those rights guaran-
teed to a criminal defendant to insure that he will be accorded the
greatest possible opportunity to utilize every facet of the constitutional-
model of a fair criminal trial. Any trial conducted in derogation of that
model leaves open the possibility that the trial reached an unfair result
precisely because all the protections specified in the Constitution were
not provided .... The protections of the Fourth Amendment are of a
wholly different order, and have nothing whatever to do with promoting
the fair ascertainment of truth at a criminal trial. . . . The Fourth
Amendment "is not an adjunct to the ascertainment of truth." The
guarantees of the Fourth Amendment "stand as a protection of quite dif-
ferent constitutional values-values reflecting the concern of our society
for the right of each individual to be let alone."w
The Court's valuation of rights affecting accuracy at trial
and the "ascertainment of truth" above "the right of each indi-
vidual to be left alone" is at the core of Schneckloth. By distin-
guishing the rights protected, the Court justified applying the
m Id. at 229-31.
'9 Id. at 231. In dissentJustice Marshall responded to this label as follows:
I must conclude with some reluctance that when the Court speaks of practicality,
what it really is talking of is the continued ability of the police to capitalize on the igno-
rance of citizens so as to accomplish by subterfuge what they could not achieve by rely-
ing only on the knowing relinquishment of constitutional rights. Of course it would be
'practical' for the police to ignore the commands of the Fourth Amendment, if by prac-
ticality we mean that more criminals will be apprehended, even though the constitu-
tional rights of innocent people also go by the board. But such a practical advantage is
achieved only at the cost of permitting the police to disregard the limitations that the
Constitution places on their behavior, a cost that a constitutional democracy cannot
long absorb.
Id. at 288 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
60 Id. at 241-42 (quoting Tehran v. United States ex rel Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 416
(1966)).
[Vol. 89
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high standard of knowing waiver to one set of rights and not to
the other.
In its consent cases since Schneckloth, the Court has moved
even further away from subjective determinations of whether a
consent was voluntary. Two cases, Illinois v. Rodrigue6 1 and Flor-
ida v. Jimeno,62 set forth a standard which examines the objective
reasonableness of the officer's behavior in reacting to the sus-
pect's consent, rather than the objective reasonableness of the
suspect in granting consent.
Writing for the Court in Rodriguez, Justice Scalia pointed out
that since officers and magistrates need only be "reasonable"
and not necessarily correct in justifying non-consent searches, it
stands to reason that the same should be true of consent
searches:
It is apparent that in order to satisfy the "reasonableness" requirement of
the Fourth Amendment, what is generally demanded of the many factual
determinations that must regularly be made by agents of the govern-
ment-whether the magistrate issuing a warrant, the police officer exe-
cuting a warrant, or the police officer conducting a search or seizure
under one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement-is not that
they always be correct, but that they always be reasonable .... The Con-
stitution is no more violated when officers enter without a warrant be-
cause they reasonably (though erroneously) believe that the person who
has consented to their entry is a resident of the premises, than it is vio-
lated when they enter without a warrant because they reasonably
(though erroneously) believe they are in pursuit of a violent felon who is
about to escape.63
After Rodriguez, it is the officer's belief that the suspect con-
sented which must be objectively reasonable.6 The court asks
6, 497 U.S. 177 (1990).
62 500 U.S. 248 (1991).
Rodrigue, 497 U.S. at 185-86.
' This rule stands in contrast to the test for whether a suspect was seized. In Cali-
fornia v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 628 (1991), and Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434
(1991), the Court held that an encounter is not a seizure if a reasonable suspect
would feel free to disregard the police and go about his business. In the seizure con-
text, unlike with consent searches, it is the suspect's belief, not the officer's, which
must be reasonable.
This distinction explains why the "no sane man" theory, supra note 44, was not
squarely addressed in Bostick 'VWe do reject, however, Bostick's argument that he
must have been seized because no reasonable person would freely consent to a search
2MCHAELJ. FREDMAN
not whether the suspect's consent actually was voluntary under
the totality of the circumstances, but rather whether the officer
reasonably perceived the suspect's consent to be voluntary un-
der the totality of the circumstances. The suspect's actual feel-
ings, whether predetermined by indoctrinated obedience or a
product of free will, are irrelevant so long as their outward
manifestation looks like voluntary consent.'
This same objective standard applies when determining the
scope of a limited consent to search. Occasionally, the police
will ask a suspect to consent to a search of limited scope,
whether in location (a request to search the garage), object (a
request to search for drugs), or time (a request to search bags
"quickly"). Other times, as with Ms. Fernandez in Padilla, the
suspect will affirmatively offer to let police conduct a limited
search without being asked. In F/orida v. fimenor the defendant
consented to a search of his car but challenged the police offi-
cer's opening of a folded brown paper bag in the course of that
search.67 Writing for the Court, ChiefJustice Rehnquist applied
the Rodriguez test to the question of whether the defendant's
consent to search his car included authorization to open con-
tainers found within the car: "The standard for measuring the
scope of a suspect's consent is that of 'objective' reasonable-
ness-what would the typical reasonable person have under-
stood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect?""e
In Jimeno, the Court concluded, a reasonable observer would
have construed the defendant's consent as allowing the further
search of closed containers.69
When a suspect limits his consent by the object of the
search, the police are entitled to search anywhere that object
of luggage that he or she knows contains drugs. This argument cannot prevail-be-
cause the 'reasonable person' test presupposes an innocent person." Bostick, 501 U.S.
at 437-38. The "reasonable person test" in Bostick examines the suspect's conduct,
whereas the reasonable person test in Rodriguez examines the officer's conduct.
' See supra notes 45-47.
500 U.S. 248 (1991).
67 1d. at 249-50.
6Id. at 251.
'9 Id. at 252.
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might be located 7 but not where the object could not possibly
be located.7' In the words ofJustice Stevens, "a lawful search of
fixed premises generally extends to the entire area in which the
object of the search may be found and is not limited by the pos-
sibility that separate acts of entry or opening may be required to
complete the search."72 However, limiting the scope of a con-
sent search has little restrictive effect on what the police may
seize if other incriminating objects are left in plain view.7s
B. THE PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE
The term "plain view" arises in two somewhat distinct
Fourth Amendment contexts. First, it refers to observations
made by police officers without physical intrusion into a consti-
tutionally protected area. 4  These observations are not
"searches" because, as Lord Camden pointed out in 1765, "the
eye cannot by the laws of England be guilty of a trespass." 75
" See, e.g., United States v. Brandon, 847 F.2d 625, 630 (10th Cir. 1988) (consent to
search for money justified looking under mattress); People v. Torrand, 622 P.2d 562,
565 (Colo. 1981) ("Where, as here, the consent is confined to certain items, the
search itself likewise must be limited to the terms of the consent. Under such circum-
stances the search must be restricted to those objects and areas which are likely to
contain the articles sought.").
7, See, e.g., State v. Younger, 702 A.2d 477, 480 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1997) (officer's opening of change purse when consent was limited to a search for a
handgun was "unauthorized, unreasonable, and unconstitutional"); Lugar v. Com-
monwealth, 202 S.E.2d 894 (Va. 1974) (consent to search for a fugitive does not justify
searching areas too small to contain a person). See also United States v. Ross:, 456
U.S. 798, 824 (1982):
The scope of a warrantless search of an automobile thus is not defined by the nature of
the container in which the contraband is secreted. Rather, it is defined by the object of
the search and the places in which there is probable cause to believe that it may be
found. Just as probable cause to believe that a stolen lawnmower may be found in a ga-
rage will not support a warrant to search an upstairs bedroom, probable cause to believe
that undocumented aliens are being transported in a van will not justify a warranless
search of a suitcase. Probable cause to believe that a container placed in the trunk of a
taxi contains contraband or evidence does notjustify a search of the entire cab.
72 Ross, 456 U.S. at 820-21.
This is the subject of Part m, infra.
' See 1 LAFAvE, supra note 40, § 2.2.
Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1029, 1066 (1765). While Fourth Amend-
ment searches are no longer strictly defined in terms of property rights-compare
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 (1967) ("The premise that property interests
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Standing alone, plain view observations do notjustify the seizure
of the items observed, but they do give rise to a high level of
probable cause which the police may use to justify a legal seizure
if other circumstances exist (e.g. exigency or a warrant for an-
other object) to justify entry.76 The Supreme Court discussed
plain view observations in its "open fields" cases" and in Katz v.
United States78 and its direct progeny,79 establishing a loose rule
that a plain view observation is only a search if it infringes on
the owner's 0 reasonable expectation of privacy.81
Just as items observed in plain view require some independ-
ent justification for their seizure, items susceptible to plain view
seizure require some independent justification for their initial
control the right of the Government to search and seize has been discredited"), with
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978) ("Legitimation of expectations of pri-
vacy by law must have a source outside of the Fourth Amendment, either by reference
to concepts of real or personal property law or to understandings that are recognized
and permitted by society.")-property was the original justification for omitting plain
view observations from the protection of the Fourth Amendment. See Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464, 466 (1928).
71 See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 464-71 (1971).
7 See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989); United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294
(1987); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
78 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
79 See, e.g., United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
0 In Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978), the Court held that only suspects who
own the property being seized or the property containing the objects being seized
possess a reasonable expectation of privacy.
SI "Objects, activities, or statements that [a suspect] exposes to the 'plain view' of
outsiders are not 'protected' because no intention to keep them to himself has been
exhibited." Katz, 389 U.S. at 367 (Harlan, J., concurring). This rule generally oper-
ates to prohibit police from employing artificial sensory aids by which a reasonable
suspect would not expect to be examined. But see Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 739-
40 (1983) (officers may use flashlights to inspect the inside of automobiles); Riey,
488 U.S. at 450 (officers may use a helicopter to inspect an enclosed greenhouse
open to the sky); Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238 (1986):
It may well be, as the Government concedes, that surveillance of private property by us-
ing highly sophisticated surveillance not generally available to the public, such as satel-
lite technology, might be constitutionally protected absent a warrant. But the
photographs here [taken with a commercial mapping camera from an airplane in navi-
gable airspace] are not so revealing of intimate details as to raise constitutional con-
cerns .... The mere fact that human vision is enhanced somewhat, at least to the degree
here, does not give rise to constitutional problems.
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search.8 2  "It has long been settled that objects falling in the
plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to
have that view are subject to seizure and may be introduced into
evidence." 3
Warrantless seizure of an item is justified under the plain
view exception where: (1) the police have lawful access to the
place from which the item can be plainly viewed; (2) the item
seized is in fact in plain view at the time it is discovered; and (3)
it is "immediately apparent" to the police at the time of discov-
ery that the item constitutes evidence of a crime.84 The "imme-
diately apparent" requirement is met only where the officers
have "probable cause to believe that an object in plain view is
[evidence of a crime] without conducting some further search
of the object."
Justice Stewart, writing for a plurality of the Court in Coo-
lidge v. New Hampshire,6 explained that plain view seizures do
not offend the twin goals of the Fourth Amendment because
82 Of course, all evidence is in plain view at the moment of seizure. "The problem
with the 'plain view' doctrine has been to identify the circumstances in which plain
view has legal significance rather than being simply the normal concomitant of any
search, legal or illegal." Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 (1971).
Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236 (1968).
See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136-37 (1990).
Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375 (1993). See also Soldal v. Cook
County, 506 U.S. 56, 66 (1992) ("In the absence of consent or a warrant permitting
the seizure of the items in question, such seizures can be justified only if they meet
the probable cause standard and if they are unaccompanied by unlawful trespass.")
(citations omitted); Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326-27 (1987) (requiring probable
cause to seize items found in plain view); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 307
(1967) ("There must, of course, be a nexus-automatically provided in the case of
fruits, instrumentalities or contraband-between the item to be seized and criminal
behavior. Thus in the case of 'mere evidence,' probable cause must be examined in
terms of cause to believe that the evidence sought will aid in a particular apprehen-
sion or conviction."); United States v. Grubczak, 793 F.2d 458, 461 (2d Cir. 1986)
("The incriminating nature of an object is generally deemed 'immediately apparent'
where police have probable cause to believe it is evidence of crime.") (quoting United
States v. Ochs, 595 F.2d 1247, 1258 (2d Cir. 1979)); United States v. Gonzalez-
Athehorta, 729 F. Supp. 248, 259 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) ("The incriminating nature of an
object is immediately apparent if the police have probable cause to believe it is evi-
dence of a crime, but if an item must be moved even slightly, to ascertain its incrimi-
natory nature, the requirement of the plain view doctrine is not satisfied.") (citations
omitted). See generally Dan Gunter, Note, The Plain View Doctrine and the Problem of In-
terpretation: The Case ofState v. Barnum, 75 OR. L. REV. 577 (1996).
86403 U.S. 443 (1971)
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they neither allow searches without probable cause nor expand
the scope of the initial search "into a general or exploratory
one":
As against the minor peril to Fourth Amendment protections, there is a
major gain in effective law enforcement. Where, once an otherwise law-
ful search is in progress, the police inadvertently come upon a piece of
evidence, it would often be a needless inconvenience, and sometimes
dangerous-to the evidence or to the police themselves-to require
them to ignore it until they have obtained a warrant particularly describ-
ing it.8"
To better insulate the public from police stretching particu-
larized searches into exploratory ones with the plain view doc-
trine, Justice Stewart also required that an officer's discovery of
an item in plain view be inadvertent to justify its lawful seizure:
"If the intentional intrusion is bottomed on a warrant that fails
to mention a particular object, though the police know its loca-
tion and intend to seize it, then there is a violation of the ex-
press constitutional requirement of 'Warrants . . .particularly
describing... [the] things to be seized."''  Stewart's inadver-
tence requirement would cause no additional inconvenience to
police, he reasoned, because if they knew about an item's loca-
tion ahead of time, they could easily include it in their warrant
application before the magistrate.9
But nineteen years later, a seven justice majority rejected
Stewart's inadvertence requirement. In Horton v. Calfomia,'
the Court found two flaws with requiring inadvertent discovery.
First, the Court could imagine no sinister motive for police to
deliberately omit an item from their warrant application.91 Po-
lice would logically seek to put as much information as they had
in their warrant application, thereby getting the broadest possi-
ble warrant; any failure to mention an item which is likely to be
present could only be due to "oversight or careless mistake,"
87 Id. at 467-68.
Id. at 471.
89 Id. at 470.
9o496 U.S. 128 (1990).
' Seeid. at 138-39.
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and correcting that mistake is not worth the administrative in-
convenience of procuring another warrant. 2 Second, the Court
criticized inadvertence as redundant upon existing limitations
on the breadth of warrants, and thus "hardly... worth the can-
dle."98 The Court argued that the legitimate goal of preventing
generalized searches is already protected by the particularity re-
quirement of the Fourth Amendment and by the axiom that "a
warrantless search [must] be circumscribed by the exigencies
which justify its initiation."9' The Court thus found inadvertency
to be superfluous to the plain view doctrine, leaving the three
requirements listed above-lawful vantage point, plain sight,
and "immediately apparent"-as the only prerequisites for a
lawful plain view seizure.95
Arizona v. Hicks sets forth the outer limits of what it means
for an item's incriminating nature to be "immediately appar-
ent." On April 18, 1984, police responded to a report that a
bullet had been fired through the floor of the defendant's
apartment, injuring a downstairs neighbor. 7 The continuing
danger to other neighbors constituted exigent circumstances
sufficient to justify the warrantless entry into the defendant's
apartment to search for the shooter, other victims, and for the
weapon. s Once inside, the officers found and seized three fire-
arms and a stocking-cap mask.9 In the course of this search, an
officer noticed two sets of state-of-the-art Bang and Olufsen ste-
reo components "which seemed out of place in the squalid and
otherwise ill-appointed four-room apartment."1' Suspecting the
components were stolen, the officer moved a turntable so he
could read the serial numbers printed on its underside.10 1 He
9 Id. at 138 n.9.
Id. at 139-40.
"Id.
See supra note 84. A number of states retained the Coolidge inadvertence re-
quirement on state law grounds despite Horton. See, e.g., State v. Arredondo, 944 P.2d
276, 282 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997); State v. Meyer, 893 P.2d 159, 165 n.6 (Haw. 1995).
6480 U.S. 321 (1987).






reported the numbers to headquarters by telephone, learned
that the components had been taken in an armed robbery, and
eventually seized them.
10 2
Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court, holding
that the officer's moving of the turntable constituted a search
separate from and additional to the lawful search for shooters,
victims, and weapons which initially brought the police into the
apartment.103 If the officer had looked at the turntable without
handling it, and was able to determine that it was stolen solely
on the basis of that look and his prior knowledge, then the plain
view doctrine would sustain the seizure.1 4
But taking action, unrelated to the objectives of the authorized intru-
sion, which exposed to view concealed portions of the apartment or its
contents, did produce a new invasion of respondent's privacy unjustified
by the exigent circumstance that validated the entry.... A search is a
search, even if it happens to disclose nothing but the bottom of a turnta-
ble.1
0 5
Hicks identifies an extra step inherent in most searches in
which the police physically move an object to better determine
its evidentiary value or that of its contents. That extra step, if
not justified by probable cause, is beyond the limits of the plain
view doctrine. The significance of the Hicks extra step limita-
tion varies directly with the size of the object of the initial
search: while a legal search for drugs justifies moving small ob-
jects and opening small containers (in effect, a general search),
a legal search for a person only justifies opening closet doors
and looking under beds or other containers large enough to
conceal a person.106
By this same token, documents require greater examination
to determine their relevance than do other physical items. In
Andresen v. Mayland,107 the Supreme Court acknowledged this
distinction:
1 Id. at 323-24.
'03 Id. at 324-25.
'0' Id. at 325.
105 Id.
'0' SeeUnited States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 820-24 (1982).
07 427 U.S. 463 (1976).
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We recognize that there are grave dangers inherent in executing a war-
rant authorizing a search and seizure of a person's papers that are not
necessarily present in executing a warrant to search for physical objects
whose relevance is more easily ascertainable. In searches for papers, it is
certain that some innocuous documents will be examined, at least curso-
rily, in order to determine whether they are, in fact, among those papers
authorized to be seized.' °a
In cases where officers are authorized to search only for cer-
tain incriminating documents, the inspection of all docu-
ments-incriminating and innocent-is inherent in the process
of deciding which documents are incriminating and which are
not.'O°
In summary, the current law allows a suspect to consent to
an otherwise illegal search, so long as his consent appears volun-
tary under the totality of the circumstances." ° The suspect's
knowledge of his right to refuse consent is an element to be
considered amongst the totality of the circumstances, but his
lack of knowledge of that right does not preclude a finding of
voluntariness."' A suspect may also limit the scope of his con-
sent, such limit to be defined by the understanding of an objec-
tively reasonable police officer witnessing the exchange.n2
Police officers may seize items not mentioned as the object of
the consent if those items are in plain view in an area where the
officers are allowed to be, and the incriminating nature of those
items is immediately apparent to the officers without moving
them."3
III. LIMITED CONSENT AND PLAIN VIEW IN THE COURTS
Two lines of cases highlight the deception inherent in plain
view seizures during limited consent searches: those where the
"' Id. at482 n.1l.
... See United States v. Soussi, 29 F.3d 565, 571-72 (10th Cir. 1994); United States v.
Menon, 24 F.3d 550, 559-60 (3d Cir. 1994); Gunter, supra note 85.
"10 See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973).
"' Id. at 249.
... See Florida v.Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991).
"' See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136-37 (1990); Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S.
321, 324 (1987).
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police search physical areas not authorized by the consent and
seize objects found therein, and those where the police search
areas authorized by the consent but seize objects other than
those mentioned to the consenting suspect. Stated differently,
the two types are those where the police exceed the scope of the
consent and those where they manipulate the scope of consent.
These sets of cases provoke different objections, and are treated
separately in the following sections.
A. EXCEEDING THE SCOPE OF CONSENT
The most noted case for plain view seizures during limited
consent searches is United States v. Dichiarinte.'" The defendant
was arrested for sale of narcotics while away from his home.' 5
When asked if he had drugs at home, the defendant responded,
"I have never seen narcotics. You guys come over to the house
and look, you are welcome to.' 1 6 The police then took the de-
fendant to his home and began searching.1 1 7 After forty-five
minutes, the defendant noticed that the officers were inspecting
documents which they had removed from a drawer near the
sofa. 8 According to the defendant, when he saw the officer
seize some currency exchange receipts, he said, "Does that look
like narcotics if that is what you want to search for?" and the of-
ficer replied, "Sorry, Pal, we are here now and this is what we are
going to do."1 9 The defendant then attempted to call off the
search, but it continued over his objections for another ten
minutes.20 The defendant was subsequently convicted of two
counts of willfal tax evasion based on the documents seized on
121that occasion.
The Court of Appeals found that the defendant's offer to
"come over to the house and look" was in reference to the drugs
being discussed, and hence construed the consent to be limited







121 Id. at 127.
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to a search for narcotics.'2 The court recognized in this situa-
tion a tremendous potential for police officers to evade the
Fourth Amendment prohibition of generalized, exploratory
searches: "Government agents may not obtain consent to search
on the representation that they intend to look only for certain
specified items and subsequently use that consent as a license to
conduct a general exploratory search."Iss
The Seventh Circuit was not alone in its fear of general ex-
ploratory searches; only seventeen days after the issuance of Di-
chiarinte, the Supreme Court published its opinion in Coolidge in
which it endorsed the plain view doctrine only after reassuring
its readers that the doctrine would not turn a limited search
"into a general or exploratory one." 24 This similarity between
the concerns of the Seventh Circuit in limiting consent searches
and the concerns of the Supreme Court in endorsing plain view
seizures illustrates the tension between the two doctrines.
Whereas the plain view doctrine supposedly guards against gen-
eral and exploratory searches by confining police to areas in
which they are legally permitted to be, consent searches afford
police the opportunity to eliminate or at least manipulate the
boundaries of those areas by misleading the consenting suspect.
The danger of a general exploratory search arises in this situa-
tion because the suspect, who would not have granted consent
had he known the actual reason for the search, is cajoled into
allowing what he perceives as a harmless investigation by the af-
firmative misrepresentations of the police officers. If, however,
the suspect knew exactly what items were susceptible to seizure
under the plain view doctrine once he grants consent, he would
at least have the opportunity to decide whether to assert his
Fourth Amendment rights. The defendant in Dichiarinte wanted
to keep the police out of his currency documents, and appar-
ently believed he had set such a limit by consenting only to a
search for narcotics, but because he was unaware of the plain
11 Id. at 129.
2 Id. at 129-30.
114 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 (1971). Dichiarinte was issued on
June 4, 1971, and Coolidge onJune 21, 1971.
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view doctrine, he was unable to protect himself until the police
had already found the currency receipts. 1'
The Dichiarinte court went on to explain how the plain view
doctrine does not, on its own, justify the expansion of a search
to areas not contemplated by the consent:
[A] t least some of the items seized and later used in the Govern-
ment's tax evasion investigation were not in plain view but had to be
opened and read. Even assuming that these items were evidence of
crime and thus subject to seizure, their criminal character was not ap-
parent on a mere surface inspection, and defendant's limited consent
did not authorize the agents' opening and reading them."'
This language is virtually identical to the Padilla court's
holding twenty six years later that "[a]ll documents which were
not immediately incriminatory on their face should not have
been seized. ' 27
Colorado's highest court reached a similar result in People v.
Torand.121 There, the defendant consented to a police request to
search his apartment for a shotgun and a thirty-five millimeter
camera.1' During the ensuing search, one police officer found
and opened a shaving kit in the bathroom.'30 Inside, he found a
high school graduation ring which he examined and noted its
unique inscription.13' The officer replaced the ring and contin-
ued his search, eventually finding the shotgun and camera for
which he was looking and arresting the defendant for bur-
"' See Dichiarinte, 445 F.2d at 128-29.
"2 Id. at 130-31. This observation was unaffected by Coolidge
127 United States v. Padilla, 986 F. Supp. 163, 170 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). Other cases
reach this same result: State v. Williams, No. 96-2817-CR, 1997 WL 365362 (Wis. Ct.
App.,July 3, 1997) (where consent given to look inside duffel bag, unlawful for police
to remove box of laundry detergent from bag and inspect it without probable cause);
City of Warwick v. Robalewski, 385 A.2d 669 (LI. 1978) (for seizure of stolen camera
during consent search to be lawful under plain view, officer must have had probable
cause to believe it was stolen before he picked it up and opened its case); People v.
Harwood, 141 Cal. Rptr. 519 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977) (where consent given to search
premises for cocaine and money, unlawful for police to intercept telephone calls).
'2 622 P.2d 562 (Colo. 1981) (en banc).
' Id. at 563.
" Id. at 564.
131 Id.
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glary.' The next morning, the same officer contacted the vic-
tim of the burglary and learned from her for the first time that a
high school graduation ring matching the description of the
one he had seen the night before in the defendant's shaving kit
was also missing.'33 The officer then obtained a warrant to re-
turn to the defendant's apartment and eventually seized the
ring.'34 The trial court, ruling on a suppression motion as to the
camera and the shotgun (they were admitted), made no find-
ings with respect to the ring.1'
The Colorado Supreme Court remanded this case for a de-
termination of whether the Pentax camera could have fit inside
the shaving kit which the officer examined.'36 The Court gave
these instructions to the trial court on remand:
If the police already found the camera before opening the shaving kit,
then the search of the kit would have been improper as exceeding the
scope of the consent. The defendant's consent to search for the shotgun
would afford no basis to search the interior of a shaving kit. However, a
shaving kit of sufficient size might well serve as a hiding place for a stolen
137
camera.
As in Hicks, Dichiarinte, and Padilla, the extra step of open-
ing the shaving kit and examining its contents was characterized
as an additional search requiring its own Fourth Amendment
justification. The consent to search for a shotgun and a thirty-
five millimeter camera was the officer's onlyjustification. Thus,
if that consent did not contemplate the opening of the shaving
kit, there was no lawful reason to do so. The general rule which
emerges from these cases is that a search based solely on con-
sent must be confined to areas and containers capable of secret-
ing the items contemplated by the consent. Just as moving a
turntable when searching for weapons and suspects was unlaw-
ful in Hicks, opening notebooks and leafing through documents




"s Id. at 566.
"6 Id. at 567.
117 Id. at 566.
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and opening a small shaving kit while searching for a large cam-
era was unlawful in Torand.
B. MANIPULATING THE SCOPE OF CONSENT
The second category of deceptive cases are those involving
searches which stay within the territorial confines contemplated
by the consent, but which are obtained by misrepresentation as
to the aim of the search. These cases are to be distinguished
from cases in which the police misrepresent their identity, not
their purpose, to gain consensual entry,ss and from cases in
which the police manufacture an emergency to gain consensual
entry.IS9
1. Pre-Schneckloth Doctrine
An early case addressing fraudulent consent requests is Al-
exander v. United States,14 although it is of tangential relevance to
" The Supreme Court has ruled definitively that a private person inviting another
into his home to conduct illegal activity must accept the risk that their guest is a gov-
ernment agent. An officer may lawfully obtain an invitation into a house by misrepre-
senting his identity. See Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 211 (1966); United
States v. Bramble, 103 F.3d 1475, 1478 (9th Cir. 1997); State v.Johnston, 518 N.W.2d
759, 762 (Wis. 1994). Readers of an earlier version of this Comment suggested that a
police officer's power to gain consensual entry by misrepresenting his purpose and
identity includes the power to misrepresent his purpose but reveal his identity. In-
deed, Judge Easterbrook recently commented on this point:
If dissimulation so successful that the suspect does not know that he is talking to an
agent is compatible with voluntariness, how could there be a rule that misdirection by a
known agent always spoils consent? Professor LaFave is rightly puzzled by courts'
greater willingness to suppress evidence when agents who reveal their status give decep-
tive answers to inquiries about the purpose of the investigation than when agents lie
about their status as agents.
United States v. Peters, 153 F.3d 445, 464 (7th Cir. 1998) (Easterbrook, J., concur-
ring) (referring to 3 LAFAVE, supra note 40, § 8.2(n), discussed infra note 172 and ac-
companying text). This "greater includes the lesser" theory ignores the fact that
undercover police encounters are treated quite differently from overt encounters in a
variety of legal contexts. For example, while a defendant may lie to an undercover
officer without repercussion, a defendant lying to a uniformed officer is subject to
prosecution for obstruction ofjustice under 18 U.S.C. § 1503, which requires specific
intent. The two situations are distinct, not a "greater" and a "lesser."
" See People v. Jefferson, 350 N.Y.S.2d 3, 4 (N.Y. App. Div. 1973) (invalidating con-
sent where police told suspects they were investigating a gas leak; suspect had no
choice but to grant entry).
,40 390 F.2d 101 (5th Cir. 1968).
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this discussion as it predates Schneckloth. In Alexander, the de-
fendant was a postal employee suspected of stealing money from
letters deposited in collection boxes on his route.41 To confirm
their suspicions, inspectors planted three letters containing one
dollar bills marked with a chemical which fluoresces in ultravio-
let light in a collection box on the defendant's route. After
observing the defendant collect those letters, the inspectors ap-
proached the defendant as he was leaving work at the end of the
day.143 The inspectors identified themselves and advised him
that they were investigating theft of jewelry from the U.S.
mails. 1 They then asked the defendant to show them his wallet
on the false grounds that the jewelry they sought was small
enough to be contained therein.'4 The defendant opened his
wallet and the marked money was discovered and seized. 46
Confronted with this evidence, the defendant confessed and led
the inspectors to his car, where they found the opened letters
they had planted in the collection box.47
The defendant was convicted of stealing, abstracting and
removing a total of seven dollars from the U.S. mails . 4  He ap-
pealed on the grounds that his consent to let the inspectors
search his wallet was involuntary because it was won by the in-
spector's deceit as to their actual purpose.4 9 The Fifth Circuit
agreed, declaring, "[i] ntimidation and deceit are not the norms
of voluntarism. In order for the response to be free, the stimu-
lus must be devoid of mendacity. We do not hesitate to undo
fraudulently induced contracts. Are the disabilities here less
maleficent?"'' 0
The Fifth Circuit's comparison of deceptive consent re-
quests to fraudulently induced contracts is not unique to Alex-




"' Id. at 103.
146 Id.
147id.
'0 Id. at 102.
149 Id. at 110.
150 Id.
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ander, although it has not proven to be a winning argument in
any other case.1 51 This result is intuitive, for search consents are
usually given under circumstances which would invalidate con-
tracts due to the great imbalance of bargaining power and the
doctrines of unconscionability and adhesion. Since criminal
suspects do not have the luxury of deliberating over the terms of
their agreement with the police, criminal courts must settle for
a less chaste "meeting of the minds" than may civil courts.
2. Post-Schneckloth Doctrine
The Alexander court, writing in 1968, had no set analytical
standard to follow. However, following the Supreme Court's
1973 Schneckloth opinion, courts are required to look at the "to-
tality of the circumstances," of which the suspect's knowledge of
his right to refuse consent is only one factor. However, knowl-
edge of one's right to refuse consent is a separate issue from
knowledge of the investigating officer's genuine motives. Is de-
liberate police deception as to the purpose of a search merely
another component of the "totality of the circumstances" or is it
a primafacie showing of coercion? Courts are split on this ques-
tion.
A recent Colorado case illustrates the current debate. In
People v. Zamora, 52 the defendant abducted a thirteen-year-old
... See, e.g., United States v. 9844 S. Titan Court, 75 F.3d 1470, 1492 (10th Cir.
1996) (referring to the right to dictate the terms of a consent as a "contractual
right"); People v. Cooney, 286 Cal. Rptr. 765, 770 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1991)
(Bea, J., dissenting) ("This formulation of how to determine the extent of the consent
to search seems to me to posit a familiar fact question, of the kind dealt with in courts
daily when issues of property or contract are determined."); Beaupre v. State, 526
S.W.2d 811, 815 (Tex. Grim. App. 1975) (rejecting defendant's argument that her of-
fer to let the sheriff search her car "was in the nature of an 'offer to contract and that
the offer died either for failure of consideration (if unilateral) or lack of acceptance
(if bilateral)'"); Williams v. City of Portsmouth, 538 F. Supp. 74, 77 (E.D. Va. 1982)
("consent to search is not a contract"); State v. Rodgers, 349 N.W.2d 453, 462 (Wis.
1984) (Abrahamson, J., dissenting) ("In contract law, if a party's manifestation of as-
sent is induced by a fraudulent or material misrepresentation upon which the party is
justified in relying, the consent may be withdrawn. I see no reason why a lower stan-
dard than that applied in a contract case should be applied when the issue is consent
to enter a home without a warrant to make an arrest when a search warrant could be
obtained and there are no exigent circumstances.") (citing Restatement (Second) of
Contracts § 164(a) (1979)).
52 940 P.2d 939 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996).
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girl on her way to school and took her to his apartment, where
he sexually assaulted her.53 He then drove the victim back to
school and told her not to tell anyone about what happened.'54
The victim told her mother anyway, and then gave a statement
to police in which she described her attacker and his apartment,
including its approximate location, its interior layout, its messy
appearance, and the presence of an unfilled waterbed frame in
the bedroom.' The police eventually located what they be-
lieved to be the assailant's apartment, and waited for him to ar-
rive.'" When the defendant, a man who did not match the
victim's description of her assailant, arrived with his girlfriend,
the police knocked on the door.' 57 The defendant answered the
door, but refused to let the police inside and talk as they re-
quested, telling the officers that the apartment was too messy.,5"
The officers then falsely told the defendant that they just
wanted a "quick look" at the layout of the apartment to aid in
their investigation of a domestic dispute in an adjacent apart-
ment." 9 The defendant succumbed to this request, allowing the
officers to enter.r' Once inside, the police found that the floor
plan, the messiness, and an unfilled waterbed frame in the bed-
room all matched the victim's description of the apartment in
which she was molested.1 61 The victim later identified the de-
fendant in a photographic lineup and he was convicted of sex-
ual assault on a child and kidnapping.
6 2
The defendant appealed on the grounds that his consent to
search his apartment was obtained through deception and was
therefore involuntary.1' A divided Colorado Court of Appeals













ing dozens of cases supporting their respective positions. Both
sides agreed to the "totality of the circumstances" analysis pre-
scribed by Schneckloth, but they disagreed as to what weight po-
lice deception is to carry within that analysis.
The majority focused on the fact that the officers' ruse re-
quest to look at the layout of the apartment was in fact the true
object of their search, albeit not for the purpose proffered.'6
The police, in the majority's view, did not exceed the scope of
their consent because the defendant voluntarily allowed them to
look at the layout of the apartment, during which time they ob-
served the incriminating waterbed frame in plain view. 5 The
majority held that the totality of the circumstances weighed in
favor of a finding of voluntariness and upheld the conviction,
because the police stayed within the scope of the consent, the
officers were not threatening or overbearing, and the defendant
knew he could refuse entry.166
In dissent, Judge Taubman questioned whether the officers
actually stayed within the limits of their consent by asking to see
the apartment's layout while secretly looking for a waterbed . 6
He then listed a dozen cases from federal and state jurisdictions
around the nation holding that police deception or misconduct
renders a consent involuntary.16 Judge Taubman concluded:
'" Id. at 943.
16 Id.
166 Id.
16 7 Id. at 947 (Taubman, J., dissenting).
'" Id. at 946-47 (citing United States v. Bosse, 898 F.2d 113, 115 (9th Cir. 1990) (a
ruse entry when the suspect is informed that the person seeking entry is a govern-
ment agent but is misinformed as to the purpose for which the agent seeks entry can-
not be justified by consent); United States v. Briley, 726 F.2d 1301, 1305 n.2 (8th Cir.
1984) (noting as an important factor as to voluntary consent whether police tell de-
fendant they are not seeking to arrest him or that he is not a suspect); United States v.
Turpin, 707 F.2d 332, 332-35 (8th Cir. 1983) (misrepresentations about the nature of
an investigation may be evidence of coercion and the misrepresentation may even in-
validate the consent if it was given in reliance on the officer's deceit); United States v.
Tweel, 550 F.2d 297, 299 (5th Cir. 1977) (consent to search is unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment if induced by deceit, trickery, or misrepresentation); McCall v.
People, 623 P.2d 397, 403 (Colo. 1981) ("Where, as here, entry into the home is
gained by a preconceived deception as to purpose, consent in the constitutional sense
is lacking"); People v. Daugherty, 514 N.E.2d 228, 232 (111. App. Ct. 1987) (Where law
enforcement officer without a warrant falsely claims that he has legitimate police
business to conduct in order to gain consent to enter the premises, such deception is
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Where a police officer, without a warrant, uses his official position of
authority and falsely claims that he has legitimate police business to con-
duct in order to gain consent to enter and search a person's home,
where the officer affirmatively and intentionally misleads the occupant
into believing he or she is not involved in a criminal investigation, and
where the defendant grants consent, at least in part, on the basis of those
misrepresentations, I would hold that such consent cannot be consid-
ered voluntary.'o
Judge Taubman's opinion is one of many from courts across
the nation which challenge deceptive consent requests on the
grounds that the public deserves more candor from uniformed
law enforcement officers. The Fifth Circuit's opinion in SEC v.
ESM Government Securities, Inc.170 is another:
We believe that a private person has the right to expect that the govern-
ment, when acting in its own name, will behave honorably. When a gov-
ernment agent presents himself to a private individual, and seeks that
individual's cooperation based on his status as a government agent, the
individual should be able to rely on the agent's representations. We
think it clearly improper for a government agent to gain access to rec-
ords which would otherwise be unavailable to him by invoking the pri-
vate individual's trust in his government, only to betray that trust.1
so unfair that it renders the consent invalid); State v. Schweich, 414 N.W.2d 227, 230
(Minn. App. 1987) (misrepresentation of the purpose of a search can rise to such a
level of deception as to invalidate the consent; by not informing defendant he was
under investigation before obtaining his consent, the state engaged in improper de-
ceptive conduct); People v. Lee, 610 N.Y.S.2d 1013, 1017-18 (Orange County Court
1994) (ruse held unfair where police engage in coercive tactics); Commonwealth v.
Slaton, 608 A.2d 5, 9 (Pa. 1992) (affirmative misrepresentation by government agent
constitutes consent through deception, which is implied coercion); State v. Bailey,
417 A.2d 915, 918-19 (1I. 1980) (consent to enter one's home cannot be deemed free
or voluntary unless person said to be consenting is aware of purpose for which police
seek to enter); State v. McCrorey, 851 P.2d 1234, 1240 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993) (police
acting in their official capacity may not actively misrepresent their purpose to gain
entry or to exceed the scope of the consent given)).
'" Zamora, 940 P.2d at 948.
170 645 F.2d 310 (1981).
171 Id. at 316. The court went on to cite Justice Brandeis's justification of the exclu-
sionary rule on the grounds that judicial sanctioning of illegal police conduct would
pollute the authority of the courts: "Crime is contagious. If the government becomes
a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for the law;, it invites every man to become a law
unto himself; it invites anarchy." Id. (citing Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,
483-85 (1928) (Brandeis,J., dissenting)).
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Even Professor Wayne LaFave, the nation's leading author-
ity on the Fourth Amendment, has noted, "as unsettling as it
may be to say that there is no surer test to apply to the Alexander
type of case than to ask if the deception is 'fair,' this is the ques-
tion which must be asked under the Schneckloth formulation."17
IV. SECRETS AND LIES
In Zamora, the officers' ruse succeeded because they lied
about their purpose and kept the plain view doctrine a secret.7 '
All the police needed was some excuse to look in the bedroom.
Once they lawfully gained that vantage point, the plain view
doctrine would justify any further action based on their confir-
mation of the victim's waterbed description. However, since the
defendant himself did not match the description given by the
victim of her attacker, the police did not have sufficient prob-
able cause to obtain a search warrant. Instead, they asked to
view the apartment for the limited purpose of gauging the floor
plan to aid in the investigation of a fictitious domestic dispute,
which the officers assured the defendant had nothing to do with
him. This case illustrates precisely the danger of plain view ex-
tensions of limited consent searches, for it is highly unlikely that
the defendant, who had already refused consent once, would
have consented had the police stated the actual reasons for
their investigation.
The factual situation in Zamora also shows why Justice Stew-
art was right to require inadvertent discovery in Coolidge, and
what the Court missed in Horton. The Horton Court could not
comprehend why the police would deliberately omit an item
they thought would be present from their warrant application!"
The Court reasoned that police officers would want to include
172 3 LAFAVE, supra note 41, § 8.2(n). The "Schneckloth formulation" Professor La-
Fave refers to is the majority's definition of "voluntariness" as reflecting a balance be-
tween effective law enforcement and "unfairness." See supra text accompanying note
56.
175 Because the police did not seize the waterbed frame on their first visit, the plain
view doctrine itself was not invoked. In all other respects, Zamora looks like a plain
view case. Furthermore, a 'fruit of the poisonous tree' analysis would yield the same
result as if this were a straight plain view case.
174 See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 138-39 (1990).
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as much information as possible in a warrant application in
hopes of securing the widest possible latitude in conducting
their search. However, police officers in a situation like that in
Zamora have different motives entirely. When securing consent
to search, police can achieve a much broader authorization by
deliberately omitting a crucial piece of information from their
consent request. If the police are able to trick the suspect into
thinking that they are investigating someone else (as they did in
Zamora) or that they are seeking objects which the suspect
knows are not present (as they also did in Zamora), it becomes
possible for the police to entice the suspect into unknowingly
revealing the incriminating evidence (the waterbed frame in
Zamora). The Horton Court was right that there is no reason to
underreport information to a magistrate when applying for a
warrant,'75 but it failed to recognize that underreporting infor-
mation to a suspect when seeking his consent can yield access to
areas which police could not otherwise search because they lack
both probable cause and an appropriate exigency, and because
the suspect would not consent to a more forthright request.
The Horton Court's other reason for rejecting the Coolidge
inadvertence requirement was that particularity restrictions on
warrants and scope restrictions on exigencies already protect
sufficiently against general, exploratory searches.76 In the cases
listed in Part A of this section-Dichiarinte, Padilla, and Torand-
limits on the scope of the search did indeed protect against
generalized searches. But in the straight deception cases-Alex-
ander, Zamora, and the cases cited by Judge Taubman177-limits
on the scope of the search did not prevent the police from ex-
ploring wherever they could lie their way into. Without an in-
advertent discovery requirement during limited consent
searches, which would suppress evidence that officers knew
about in advance of their search but did not mention when
gaining entry, police have a motive to conceal their purpose and
nothing but their own creativity to prevent them from engaging
7 Id. at 138.
Id. at 139.
77 See supra note 168.
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in precisely the kind of generalized, exploratory searches that
the Fourth Amendment abhors.
The above analysis suggests that an inadvertent discovery
rule for limited consent searches would solve the problem of
deceptive police behavior. Such a rule would require police to
articulate prior to any search, either in their warrant application
or their consent request, the actual objects of their proposed
search. Any objects found in plain view thereafter would be
admissible only if the police genuinely did not expect those
items to be there.
However, any rule which depends upon the subjective in-
tent of police officers is inherently easy for police to manipulate
and hence difficult for courts to enforce.'8 In Zamora, for ex-
ample, police wishing to admit the waterbed frame under an in-
advertence rule would simply make no record of the victim's
description of the waterbed, proceed as they did, and then
claim at the suppression hearing that their discovery of the wa-
terbed was inadvertent and its relevance corroborated by the
victim only after the initial search. If this fact pattern seems in-
plausible, compare it with the officer's behavior in Torand, a
case decided while the Coolidge inadvertence rule still ruled the
land, where the officer found a high school ring "inadvertently"
during a limited consent search for a camera and a shotgun and
only determined its relevance when talking to the victim the
next morning.1 The officer's version of events in Torand seems
perfectly tailored to sidestep the inadvertence requirement and
thus avoid any constitutional objection from the court.
In general, the only ways to avoid the manipulation of facts
caused by subjective standards are, as the Schneckloth Court real-
ized, by objectively examining the totality of the circumstances
or by requiring uniform warnings.' When deliberate deceit by
government agents is one of the circumstances present, it is dif-
ficult to find that the suspect's consent was voluntary. Courts
which have done so have uniformly voiced their disapproval of
'78 See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 229-30 (1973).
179 See People v. Torand, 622 P.2d 526, 564 (Colo. 1981).
'go See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 229-30.
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the deceit they allow, and most have allowed only ruses where
they do not exceed some level of fundamental "fairness."'8 '
Herein lies the failure of Schneckloth. When "fairness" be-
comes one of the criteria in evaluating the totality of the cir-
cumstances, the entire test becomes meaningless. "Fairness" is a
trump card capable of defeating whatever other careful and ob-
jective factors the court has compiled for or against a finding of
"voluntariness." In addition, since "voluntariness" itself is a sub-
jectively weighted term to begin with, defining it in terms of
"fairness" is like multiplying two independent variables-no-
body can predict the result and the court is left with just as free
a hand as if there were no test at all.
A simple warning by the police, given before all limited con-
sent searches begin and advising the suspect that any incrimi-
nating evidence found in the course of the search can be seized
and used against him, would solve the whole problem. Return-
ing to Padilla as an illustration, when told they may search for
drugs only, the police should be required to respond that other
items, including documents, may be subject to seizure if found
in the course of this search. If the suspect still consents, so be it.
However, now she will get what she deserves. Courts would no
longer have to determine whether voluntariness was present be-
cause the warning would serve as a proxy for voluntariness,
guaranteeing that every suspect knew to what they were consent-
ing. Police would no longer be able to deceive suspects as to the
purpose of their search in order to gain consensual entry, a
practice of which courts across the nation have disapproved.
Finally, the Supreme Court would be able to tie up some doc-
trinal loose ends. First, the Court would complete its analysis of
the plain view inadvertence requirement that it left unfinished
with respect to consent searches in Horton. And second, the
Court would salvage the totality of the circumstances test of
Schneckloth which stands in grave danger of emasculation by
... See People v. Zamora, 940 P.2d 939, 942 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996); People v.
Daugherty, 514 N.E.2d 228 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (ruses tolerable if they do not exceed
the bounds of fundamental fairness); 3 LAFAVE, supra note 40, § 8.2(n) (there is no
surer test to apply to deception cases than to ask if the deception is "fair").
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courts using "fairness" as part of the totality of the circum-
stances.
Such a warning system, required only in the case of limited
consent searches, would prevent only intentionally deceptive
police conduct. In the far more frequent case of general con-
sent searches, no warning is necessary because the police may
rely on the terms of the actual consent, not the plain view doc-
trine, to justify any seizures. And in cases like Padila", where the
suspect volunteers her limited consent without any police ma-
nipulation, this warning requirement would potentially curtail
only an investigative device which was offered to the police as a
windfall. It would not restrict police capacity to affirmatively in-
vestigate as they would have without the suspect's spontaneous
offer of consent.
V. CONCLUSION
The current law of limited consent searches and plain view
seizures combines to create a wide avenue for police to gain en-
try by substituting deceit for probable cause. By proffering one
purpose and concealing another, police play a game of bait-and-
switch which leaves the victim unwittingly deprived of his Fourth
Amendment rights and courts complaining that the police are
not being "fair." The Supreme Court's current guidelines for
consent searches and plain view seizures, while quite workable
in most situations, fail at their intersection, providing inade-
quate protection against the general exploratory searches that
the Fourth Amendment abhors. The only effective way to pre-
vent police from using the plain view and consent exceptions to
investigate by deception is to require police to inform consent-
ing suspects prior to limited searches that incriminating items
other than the stated objects of the search will be subject to sei-
zure and will be used against them if discovered in plain view.
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